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Section 1: Introduction  
This article sheds light on a series of events that triggered escalating tensions over land and 
resources in the coast communities of Lagos, Nigeria. This article provides an in-depth 
analysis of Nigeria’s laws on expropriation and the processes of acquiring land and 
compensating landholders in the Lekki Free Trade Zone (LFTZ) case. Specifically, the 
analysis addresses the following research questions: 
 
1) Do Nigeria’s laws comply with internationally recognized standards on 
expropriation and compensation?  
2) Did the government follow international standards on expropriation and 
compensation in the LFTZ case?  
3) What  measures can be recommended to the Nigerian government to  the balancing 
of property rights with the public interest, thus ensuring the sustainable 
development of both affected communities and the general public? 
 
Proposing law reform as a solution to the recurring issue of insufficient compensation, this 
article answers research question (1) by assessing Nigeria’s laws on expropriation and 
compensation to determine whether they comply with internationally recognized standards as 
established by the Voluntary Guidelines on the Responsible Governance of Tenure (FAO 
2012). To conduct the analysis of Nigerian laws and practices related to land expropriation 
and compensation, the authors utilized the legal indicators on Nigeria from the Voluntary 
Guidelines on the Responsible Governance of Tenure dataset available on Land Portal.
 6
  This 
dataset measures national expropriation laws against international standards and is publicly 
available on the Land Portal (Tagliarino 2016, 2017).  
 
Answering research question (2) entailed conducting a desk review of primary and secondary 
sources on the LFTZ case as well as surveying 140 households from 10 communities that 
were affected by the LFTZ. The survey questions asked about the type of compensation, 
resettlement, and other entitlements granted to affected communities, the process by which 
compensation was calculated and land was expropriated, and whether the amount given was 
sufficient to cover income and other livelihood losses.  Interviews were also conducted with 
local NGOs, government bodies, and the private sector to better understand the various 
viewpoints on the LFTZ case. Research question (3) was answered by using the findings from 
the legal analysis and LFTZ case study to develop a set of evidence-based recommendations 
for legal reform of the LUA. 
 
Section 1.1: Background on the LFTZ case 
In 2004, the Lagos State Government (LSG) set aside 16,500 hectares of expropriated land for 
the development of the LFTZ (LSG 2016).
7
 Still under construction and designed to be the 
largest free trade zone in Africa, the LFTZ is intended to create jobs, optimize manufacturing 
and industrial development, and attract foreign direct investment (BBC Africa Business 
Report 2016). The former Lagos State Governor, Babatunde Raji Fashola, stated that the 
LFTZ would address the public concern that importing foreign goods means exporting jobs 
                                                     
6 See www.landportal.info 
7 The LFTZ was initiated through a joint venture between a state-owned company called Lekki Worldwide Investments 
(LWI), the LSG, and a Chinese consortium of companies led by the China Civil Engineer Construction Corporation 
(CCECC). This joint venture resulted in the establishment of the Lekki Free Zone Development Company (LFZDC). The 





(BBC Africa Business Report 2010). Even though the LSG justified the expropriation as 
serving the “public interest” of creating jobs for Nigerians and stimulating local economic 
growth, the LFTZ is tax-free for foreign investors. Foreign companies can bring their own 
employees into the LFTZ and take profits back to their home countries (BBC Africa Business 
Report 2016). Since most of the LFTZ has not yet been built, it remains to be seen whether 
Nigerians will reap significant economic benefits from the project (Hoops 2017). 
 
Regardless of whether the LFTZ serves a genuine “public purpose”, the process of developing 
the LFTZ indicates poor compliance, in law and in practice, with internationally recognized 
standards on expropriation, compensation, and resettlement. The land acquired for the LFTZ 
was historically used by indigenous communities for farming, grazing, collecting firewood, 
retrieving medicinal plants, and engaging in customary practices. In response to losing their 
rights and access to farmland, affected communities
8
 demanded compensation, alternative 
land, jobs, and equity shares from the companies involved in the LFTZ. In 2007, the LSG, 
Lekki Worldwide Investment Limited (LWIL), and nine affected communities signed a 
legally binding Memorandum of Understanding (MOU). The MOU promised compensation, 
alternative land, jobs, healthcare, and educational opportunities to the communities affected 
by expropriation. However, an independent fact-finding tribunal, commissioned by the LSG, 
found in 2016 that the majority of entitlements listed in the MOU still had not been granted to 
affected communities (LSG 2016). To further study the LFTZ case, our research group 
interviewed affected communities, government agencies, and private sector entities in August 
and September 2017. Our findings show that the majority of compensation and other 
entitlements listed in the MOU still had not been granted to affected communities. As 
discussed in Section 3, most of the households we surveyed were still waiting for 
compensation and other promised benefits, while continuing to live without land to grow 
crops or means for sufficient income to sustain their livelihoods. Among those who actually 
received compensation, none believed that the amount granted was sufficient to cover the 
losses they incurred from the expropriation. 
 
The LFTZ case illustrates how weak expropriation laws that fail to meet international 
standards can enable land expropriation without sufficient compensation.
9
 We argue that the 
legal provisions in Nigeria’s Land Use Act 1990 (LUA) are in desperate need of reform, 
primarily for the following reasons:   
1. The LUA does not establish a clear legal definition of “public interest” to allow for 
judicial review of government expropriation decisions;  
2. The LUA does not require the government to follow clear, robust and transparent 
methods of calculating compensation; 
3. The LUA does not establish a deadline by which compensation must be paid;  
4. The LUA does not respect the indigenous right to Free Prior and Informed Consent 
(FPIC) by incorporating community negotiation and consultation into expropriation 
and compensation processes (UN 2013); 
5. The LUA neither obliges the government to grant alternative land to affected 
populations nor does it establish protections against corruption pertaining to 
compensation payments.  
                                                     
8 “Affected communities” for purposes of this article are defined as communities whose land tenure rights were affected by 
the expropriation for the LFTZ. 
9 “Compensation” for purposes of this article is defined as the payment, in cash or in kind, made by governments or acquiring 
bodies to landholders affected by expropriation. Compensation “in kind” may include alternative land, equity share in 




Due to the LUA’s inadequacies, the LSG and the private sector actors were able to acquire 
vast tracts of land without first consulting affected populations or ensuring that the 
expropriation did not leave them worse off than before their land was taken. 
 
This article is divided into four sections: 
 Section 1 provides an introduction to the case study and analysis 
 Section 2 provides an analysis of whether Nigeria’s laws comply with 
international standards on expropriation and compensation.  
 Section 3 provides an analysis of whether the LSG’s actions in the LFTZ case 
comply with international standards on expropriation and compensation.  
 Section 4 draws conclusions from the analysis and presents a set of evidence-
based recommendations for reforming the LUA to ensure compliance with 
international standards on expropriation and compensation. 
 
Section 2: Comparison of Nigerian Laws with International Standards on Expropriation 
and Compensation 
 
International standards on expropriation and compensation are established in Section 16 of the 
Voluntary Guidelines on the Responsible Governance of Tenure (VGs) (FAO 2012). The VGs 
are the first internationally recognized guiding principles on land tenure. The VGs are 
globally applicable soft law which aim at protecting the land tenure rights of all people, 
particularly the vulnerable and marginalized. The VGs were endorsed by  all 193 members of 
the UN Committee on World Food Security (CFS), in 2012 (Kropiwnicka 2012). This 
article’s legal analysis is primarily based on Section 16 of the VGs highlights of which are 
given:  
 
Table 1 – Highlights from Section 16 of VGs 
 
According to Section 16 of the VGs, States should: 
 Provide a clear definition of “public purpose” in law to allow for judicial review  
 Only acquire the minimum resources necessary 
 Be sensitive where proposed expropriations involve areas of particular cultural, 
religious, or environmental significance, or where the land is important to the 
livelihoods of the poor and vulnerable  
 Identify, inform, and consult affected populations at all stages of the expropriation 
process  
 Pay fair and prompt compensation to all legitimate tenure rights holders based on 
objectively assessed values  
 To the extent that resources permit, provide productive alternative land and 








Section 2.1: Nigeria’s Legal Framework on Expropriation 
The Constitution of Nigeria (1999) states that no property can be acquired except for purposes 
prescribed in a law that grants “prompt payment of compensation” and “gives to any person 
claiming such compensation a right to challenge compensation decisions in court” (Section 
44, GON 1999). This constitutional provision is implemented through Section 28 of the LUA, 
which permits State Governors to acquire statutory and customary rights of occupancy for the 
“overriding public interest” (Section 28, GON 1990). Initially passed as a Presidential Decree 
in 1978 during Nigeria’s era of military rule, the LUA eventually became legislation in 1990. 
Widely considered by scholars and practitioners in Nigeria to be outdated and inadequate, the 
LUA has undergone several failed attempts at amendment (Ako 2009).  
The LUA vests all land to State Governors in trust to be administered “for the use and 
common benefit of all Nigerians” (Section 1, GON 1990). Individuals and communities are 
not legally permitted to own land in Nigeria. Under sections 5 and 6 of the LUA, State 
Governors are authorized to grant statutory rights of occupancy to landholders in rural and 
urban areas (GON 1990). State Governors can also grant customary rights of occupancy to 
any person for agricultural, residential, grazing, and other purposes. However, the LUA does 
not explicitly grant legal rights to landholders of unfarmed, undeveloped land (Section 6, 
LUA; Wily et al. 2016). The LUA also states that “no single right of occupancy shall be 
granted…in excess of 500 hectares if granted for agricultural purpose, or 5,000 hectares if 
granted for grazing purposes” (Section 6(b)(2), GON 1990).  
 
Under section 36, customary occupiers or holders who used land for agricultural purposes 
prior to passage of the LUA are considered lawful possessors of their agricultural land “as if a 
customary right of occupancy had been granted to the occupier and holder.” In section 51, the 
LUA defines customary rights of occupancy as “the right of a person or community lawfully 
using or occupying land in accordance with customary law.” The Local Government, if it is 
satisfied that an occupier or holder is entitled to possession, and upon the production of the 
occupier’s sketch, diagram, or sufficient description of land, may register the holder or 
occupier and grant a customary right of occupancy (Section 36(3), GON 1990). However, 
State Governors retain broad discretion to revoke customary rights of occupancy for the 
“public interest”, as was done in the LFTZ case (Section 28, GON 1990).  
 
Section 2.2: Clear definition of “public purpose” in law to allow for judicial 
review  
 
The FAO Handbook states that an exercise in compulsory acquisition is more likely to be 
considered legitimate if land is taken for a purpose clearly identified in legislation (FAO 
2008). However, Nigeria’s LUA contains a vague, open-ended legal definition of “public 
purpose,” ostensibly granting State Governors broad discretion to establish a public purpose 
justification for the compulsory acquisition of land. Section 51 of the LUA states that “public 
purpose” includes “for exclusive Government Use or for general public use”, use by any 
corporate body (if government is a shareholder),  or for mining purposes or “economic, 
industrial or agricultural development” (Section 51, GON 1990). Since Section 51 states 
“public purpose includes…”, the list of purposes is not exhaustive, suggesting that the State 
Governor can expropriate for other purposes not listed in the Act. The vaguely defined 
purposes in the LUA are problematic for a number of reasons. Since there are no checks in 
place to ensure corporate parties granted expropriated land would serve the public interest, 
this provision could allow expropriation to be used exclusively for private economic gain 
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without benefitting the public. Moreover, the LUA does not limit the State Governor’s 
authority to acquire land under the pretext of a public purpose and transfer such land to 
private companies, even when the actual purpose will not promote local economic 
development or otherwise serve a public purpose. 
 
Both statutory and customary rights of occupancy can be revoked for the “public interest” 
(Section 28, GON 1990). Statutory rights can be acquired when land is needed for “public 
purposes within the State”, including when land is needed for mining or the construction of 
oil pipelines (Section 28(2) GON 1990). Similarly, customary rights can be acquired for 
public purposes, mining purposes, the extraction of building materials, and other purposes 
(Section 28(3) GON 1990).  
 
The LUA does not explicitly subject the State Governors’ decision on what constitutes a 
“public purpose” to oversight by the judiciary, though it can be presumed that Nigerian courts 
may overrule a State Governor’s decision if there is a violation of the “public purpose” 
provisions. But it is unclear under what circumstances such a violation would arise. The LUA 
does not provide guidance to allow for judicial scrutiny of “public interest” decisions. The 
LUA’s vagueness opens the door for potential misuse and abuse of expropriation power by 
the Governor; there is no statutory basis on which courts can keep this power in check. In 
practice, Nigerian courts rarely overrule expropriation decisions made by the State Governors. 
In our legal review, we found only one instance in which the Lagos High Court ruled that the 
State Governor’s decision to expropriate land for development purposes was unconstitutional 
(Totaro 2017). However, this High Court ruling did not focus on the “public purpose” issue, 
but rather held the expropriation and forced eviction of communities were unconstitutional 
because there was no resettlement plan in place (BBC 2017). 
 
Section 2.3: Only acquire the minimum resources necessary. Be sensitive where 
proposed expropriations involve areas of particular cultural, religious, or 
environmental significance, or where the land is important to the livelihoods of 
the poor and vulnerable. 
 
The LUA does not require State Governors to minimize the amount of land acquired to the 
amount necessary to achieve a public purpose. There are no restrictions in the LUA on the 
type of land that the Governor is permitted to acquire. The LUA does not oblige the Governor 
to respect the indigenous right to Free Prior and Informed Consent prior to initiating 
development projects (United Nations 2013).  Furthermore, the LUA does not oblige State 
Governors to be sensitive to areas of cultural, religious, or environmental significance or areas 
held by the poor and vulnerable groups such as indigenous and rural communities.  
 
 
Section 2.4: Identify, inform, and consult affected populations at all stages of the 
expropriation process  
 
The LUA does not require the government to survey affected landholders, provide 
information on the project, or consult landholders prior to expropriating land for development 
projects. Section 28(7) of the LUA merely states that rights of occupancy shall be 
extinguished “on receipt by him of a notice or on such later date as may be stated in the 
notice” (GON 1990). 
 
Section 2.4: Pay fair and prompt compensation to all legitimate tenure rights 





In addition to Section 16, several other provisions in the VGs and other international guidance 
documents suggest that compensation should cover the loss of economic activities as well as 
intangible values (e.g., cultural, spiritual historical value), and not be limited to the market 
value of crops and improvements made on the land.
10
 However, under section 29(1) of the 
LUA, when land is expropriated, holders and occupiers are entitled to compensation based 
only on the land’s “unexhausted improvements” (GON 1990). “Unexhausted improvements” 
are defined in section 51 of the LUA as “anything of any quality permanently attached to the 
land, directly resulting from the expenditure of capital or labour by an occupier…and includes 
buildings, plantations of long-lived crops or trees…but does not include the result of ordinary 
cultivation other than growing produce” (Sect 51, GON 1990). In other words, compensation 
is limited to the improvements and crops on the land, but does not cover the value of the land 
itself. This provision effectively precludes holders of unfarmed, undeveloped commons from 
obtaining any compensation when their land is expropriated. Additionally, the LUA does not 
require that compensation reflect the loss of economic activities, spiritual or cultural values, 
and other livelihood needs.  
 
According to a Nigerian lawyer at Lekki Free Zone Development Company (LFZDC) we 
interviewed, the Lagos Lands Bureau, which acts on behalf of the State Governor on land-
related matters, has broad discretion to value compensation for crops and has often used 
arbitrary, outdated assessment methods resulting in insufficient compensation rates. Since the 
LUA does not contain clear legal provisions that ensure compensation addresses all land 
values and livelihood losses and is adjusted to reflect inflation and current market rates, 
landholders may have little recourse or ability to hold the Lands Bureau accountable if they 
are dissatisfied with compensation decisions. Even if affected landholders challenge 
compensation decisions in court, the LUA does not provide adequate guidance for judges to 
follow when determining whether compensation decisions violate the law. Overall, the LUA 
fails to prevent the Lands Bureau from engaging in arbitrary, ad-hoc decision-making on 
compensation, and thus leaves Nigerian landholders vulnerable to expropriation without 
sufficient compensation. 
 
Although the term “negotiation” does not appear in Section 16 of the VGs, it can be argued 
that compensation negotiations between affected communities and governments are necessary 
to obtain objectively assessed values. Fair and transparent negotiations can help break down 
barriers between the acquiring agency and affected communities, and permit each party to 
better understand the needs of the other (FAO 2008). Without a right to negotiate 
compensation, affected communities may be more likely to be dissatisfied with compensation 
decisions made by governments behind closed doors.  
 
                                                     
10 For example, section 9.7 of the VGs establishes that “States should, in drafting tenure policies and law, take into account 
the social, cultural, spiritual, economic and environmental values of land.” Section 18.2 of the VGs also states “Policies and 
laws related to valuation should strive to ensure that valuation systems take into account non-market values, such as social, 
cultural, religious, spiritual and environmental values where applicable. The FAO Handbook on Compulsory Acquisition and 
Compensation also states that “the value for compensation should include more than the value of the land and improvements. 
The disturbance accompanying compulsory acquisition often means that people lose access to the sources of their 
livelihoods. This can be due to a farmer losing agricultural fields, a business owner losing a shop, or a community losing its 
Compulsory acquisition of land and compensation. Valuation, compensation and taking possession traditional lands. 
Compensation may be awarded for the disturbance or disruption to a person’s life under certain conditions. Some countries 
allow for additional compensation for personal distress in recognition that the sale is not voluntary and people may be deeply 
emotionally, culturally, or spiritually affected by the loss of their land” (FAO 2008) 
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The LUA does not grant affected landholders the right to negotiate compensation. As 
discussed above, the Lands Bureau is granted broad discretion to determine a fair rate of 
compensation without a system of checks to ensure objective assessment. Without a 
procedure by which affected landholders can participate in compensation decision-making, it 
is unlikely that the Lands Bureau will be equipped to fully comprehend the magnitude of the 
livelihood losses that result from expropriation. The LUA’s “take it or leave it” approach to 
providing compensation arguably forces the affected landholder into the unfavorable position 
of having to choose between no compensation and insufficient compensation.  
 
Although section 44 of the 1999 Constitution of Nigeria requires “prompt” compensation, the 
LUA does not require compensation to be paid prior to the taking of possession of the 
acquired land (GON 1990, 1999). The LUA does not even establish a deadline for payment of 
compensation. Presumably, compensation may be paid at any time after the acquisition of 
land, meaning that affected landholders may be forced to wait for years for compensation 
payments.  
 
Section 2.5: Provide productive alternative land and adequate housing  
 
The LUA partially complies with this provision because it permits alternative land to be 
granted to affected landholders if their right of occupancy is revoked. However, the Governor 
has discretion to offer alternative land, but he is not legally obligated to do so. The LUA 
grants affected landholders either monetary compensation or alternative land, but not both. 
Moreover, there is nothing in the LUA requiring that alternative land be productive, suitable, 
or of the same status as the land acquired. Section 33 of the LUA provides that the 
“Governor…may in his or its discretion offer in lieu of compensation…resettlement in any 
other place or area by way of reasonable alternative accommodation (if appropriate in the 
circumstances)” (GON 1990). This provision does not guarantee suitable alternative land for 
affected landholders.  
 
 
Section 3:  International Standards and the LFTZ Expropriation Case  
 
This section examines the actions taken by the LSG in the LFTZ case to determine if the LSG 
complied with international standards on expropriation and compensation. The findings from 
the research reveal that the LSG did not comply with several key international standards, 
particularly those calling for transparent and participatory expropriation processes and prompt 
payment of compensation.  
 
Section 3.1: The 2007 MOU 
 
According to a lawyer we interviewed at Social and Environmental Rights Action Center 
(SERAC),
11
 the LSG did not consider compensating affected communities or providing 
alternative land until SERAC began advocating on behalf of the communities in 2007. A 
series of meetings led to the development of an MOU in 2007 between the LSG, the Ibeju-
Lekki Local Government Council, nine affected communities, and Lekki Worldwide 
Investment Limited (LWIL). The nine communities that are parties to the MOU are: 
 
1. Idasho 
                                                     
11 SERAC is a Nigerian human rights organization that represented nine affected communities when negotiating the MOU 













Source: Oluwo. D. 2015. 
 
Although SERAC represented nine communities in the MOU, there may be as many as 26 
communities actually affected by the LFTZ, according to the SERAC representative. The 
MOU states that the LFTZ must comply with all applicable national and international legal 
standards. The MOU obliges the LSG to provide a number of compensation entitlements to 
affected communities, including: 
 A 2.5% equity share capital in LWIL; 
 Workforce development initiatives such as skills training, job creation, and capacity 
building; 
 Access to educational opportunities at primary and secondary schools; 
 Access to health care and recreational services; 
 Prompt payment of compensation for all genuine claims made by members of affected 
villages; 
 No less than 750 hectares of unencumbered land for the resettlement of communities 
displaced by the project; and 
 Certificates of occupancy covering the 750 hectares of unencumbered land.  
 
The MOU further provides that the Lagos state government shall not displace the three 
communities (Idotun, Itoke, and Okunraiye) whose land is identified for a proposed seaport 
10 
 
and, if such seaport is developed, shall provide no less than 170 hectares of unencumbered 
land. These communities have not yet been displaced; however, the seaport is currently under 
construction and is likely to cause displacement soon. In their interviews, some communities 
alleged that they had been threatened to vacate by company officials involved in the seaport’s 
construction. 
 
While at first glance, the MOU appears to provide adequate entitlements to affected 
communities, a closer examination reveals serious flaws. Firstly, the MOU does not provide 
specifics regarding where the resettlement land must be located, how many jobs must be 
provided, how many schools and healthcare facilities must be built, and how much 
compensation must be paid.  
 
Secondly, there is no deadline by which MOU entitlements must be honored, meaning they 
may be paid at any time. As discussed below, the lack of a deadline enabled the LSG and 
LWIL to proceed for the past ten years without honoring the provisions of the MOU. 
 
Thirdly, the MOU lumps all entitlements into one pot to be given to all nine communities, and 
thus ignores inter- and intra-community differences, such as different socio-economic and 
demographic profiles, endowments of land, crop yields, income levels, and more. According 
to the MOU, the 750 hectares promised as resettlement land are supposed to be shared by all 
nine communities. As discussed below, the implementation of this MOU provision led to a 
convoluted situation in which overlapping claims and competing interests prevented affected 
communities from actually taking possession of resettlement land.  
 
Fourthly, the MOU designates a Resettlement Committee
12
 as the entity responsible for 
implementing the provisions of the MOU, but it fails to establish specific obligations that the 
Committee must fulfill. There is no requirement in the MOU stipulating how often the 
Committee must meet and the MOU does not prescribe a timeframe for fulfilling the various 
provisions. The MOU further states that the Committee must ensure that “members of the 
affected villages and communities have free and effective access to information relevant to 
their understanding and participation in the LFTZ.” The MOU states, in the event of a dispute 
regarding the MOU, parties can appoint mediators and, if that fails, can settle the dispute 
through arbitration. However, the lack of clear deadlines and other obligations imposed on the 
Resettlement Committee makes it difficult for affected communities to find grounds on which 
to challenge decisions taken by the Committee and otherwise hold the Committee accountable 
for ensuring compliance with the MOU. 
 
Section 3.2: Implementation of the 2007 MOU 
 
The research findings discussed below are based on surveys conducted in August 2017 with 
140 households from 10 different affected communities. Interviews were also conducted with 
Social and Environmental Rights Action Center (SERAC)
13
, the Lekki Free Zone 
Development Company (LFZDC), the Lands Bureau, Lagos Ministry of Commerce, Industry 
and Cooperatives, and Lekki Worldwide Investment Limited (LWIL). Public records, 
including the 2007 MOU and the 2016 “Government White Paper on the Report of the 
Tribunal of Inquiry into the Cause of Civil Disturbances at the Lekki Free Trade Zone on 
                                                     
12 The Resettlement Committee is charged with implementing the MOU and must be comprised of representatives from the 
Ibeju-Lekki Local Government Council, LWIL, and affected communities. The LSG must ensure that affected villages and 
communities constitute no less than 30% representation of the Resettlement Committee.   
13 SERAC is a Nigerian human rights organization that represented nine affected communities when negotiating the MOU 
with the Lagos government and interested companies. 
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October 12, 2015” (hereinafter “Government White Paper”) were also reviewed. 14 The 
evidence provided here is also supported by secondary sources including news articles. 
 
In August 2017, we surveyed 140 household heads from 10 affected communities, nine of 
which signed the MOU through their representatives, to determine whether they had received 
compensation, alternative land, or other entitlements promised by the MOU. The 
randomization of the sample was not possible because we had to comply with communities’ 
customary norms. In particular, in order to conduct the surveys, we had to first obtain 
permission from each community chief. Once the chiefs consented, they would then call 
members of the community to come and participate in the survey. Under customary norms 
and practices of the communities, the male heads of household have sole authority to speak on 
behalf of the household. In a few cases, widows also participated in the survey as can be seen 
in table 3. Respondents had to be selected for the survey based on whether they were willing 
to participate in the community meetings during which we were allowed to administer the 
questionnaire. Furthermore, any sampling stratification would be highly speculative, since 
there is no official register or list of all those living within the affected communities, so the 
total population of affected communities and their socio-economic and demographic 
composition is unknown. When asked how many households and individuals lived within 
each community, the chiefs and other community members were only able to give us a rough 
estimate of total households. With these limitations in mind, we estimate that our sample 
represents around 12% of the total number of households in the 10 communities based on the 


















                                                     
14 The Government White Paper was published in response to a clash between affected communities and police that ensued 
after communities barricaded the entrance to LFTZ in protest of the project. The incident resulted in the death of the 
Managing Director of the Lekki Free Trade Zone (LFTZ), Tajudeen Disu (LSG 2016). Disu reportedly died from a gunshot, 
but there were conflicting accounts of who fired the shot. The police subsequently arrested Okunraiye community members 
believed to be responsible for the death (LSG 2016). Meanwhile, community members stated in a sworn affidavit that a stray 
bullet fired by police killed Disu (LSG 2016). 
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Table 2 – Sample composition: respondents by community 
COMMUNITY 




SHARE (%) OF 






TOTAL NO. OF 
HOUSEHOLDS 
[C] 
RESPONDENTS / TOTAL 
NO. OF HOUSEHOLDS 
(%) 
[D] 
Idasho 20 14.29 110 18.18 
Idotun 23 16.42 80 28.75 
Ilege 6 4.29 120 5.00 
Imobido 6 4.29 100 6.00 
Itoke 21 15.00 90 23.33 
Okunraye 17 12.14 250 6.80 
Ilekuru 11 7.86 50 22.00 
Tiye 17 12.14 100 17.00 
Imagbon-Segun 9 6.43 150 6.00 
Oke-Segun 10 7.14 40 25.00 
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Table 3 – Sample composition: main socio-economic and demographic features 
GENDER 
SEX N % 
Male 123 87.86 
Female 17 12.14 
Total 140 100.00 
AGE 
AGE GROUP N % 
25-34 34 24.29 
35-44 42 30.00 
45-54 27 19.28 
55-64 3 2.14 
65+ 34 24.29 
Total 140 100.00 
LITERACY 
LITERACY LEVEL N % 
Cannot read and write 41 29.29 
Can sign (write) only 3 2.14 
Can read only 3 2.14 
Can read and write 93 66.43 
Total 140 100.00 
EDUCATION 
HIGHEST GRADE COMPLETED N % 
None/never attended school 27 19.29 
Pre-primary/kindergarten 1 0.71 
Primary 49 35 
Secondary 50 35.71 
Higher 13 9.29 
Total 140 100.00 
EMPLOYMENT STATUS 
CURRENT EMPLOYMENT STATUS (LAST WEEK) N % 
Worked for pay (salary, wage, self-employed, …) 51 36.42 
Worked without pay (apprentice, family business, …) 39 27.86 
Did not work but have a job (sick, vacation, seasonal, ...) 3 2.14 
Did not work but looked for a job 13 9.29 
Did not work and didn't look for a job (unemployed, retired…) 34 24.29 
Total 140 100.00 
 
3.3 Access to information and participation during the land acquisition process 
 
After publishing a notice in an Official Gazette, the Government acquired 823 Sq. Kilometers 
of land through expropriation in 1993 (LSG 2016). In 2004, 16,500 hectares of this land was 




As shown in table 4, our survey research coupled with our interview with SERAC indicates 
that the LSG failed to adequately survey, inform, and consult many of the affected 
communities living in the vicinity of the LFTZ prior to the acquisition of 16,500 hectares of 
land in 2006. The vast majority of households interviewed responded that the government and 
private companies did not inform or consult them regarding the LFTZ prior to taking 
possession of the land (Table 4). Overall, the results from the survey suggest that the level of 
participation of local communities during the land acquisition process was very low, and 
communities were granted little to no information on the LFTZ project as shown in table 5.  
 
Table 4 - Participation and information of local communities affected by the LFTZ 
Question 
Yes No 
N % N % 
Were you informed about the LFTZ project before 
the project began? 
34 24.29 106 75.71 
Before the project began, were you consulted about 
the implications of the project on your community? 
5 3.57 135 96.43 
Were you informed about the expropriation before 
the project began? 
21 15.00 119 85.00 
Were you given an opportunity to give input in the 
expropriation plans? 
4 2.86 136 97.14 
Were you made aware of any environmental/social 
impact assessment conducted for the project? 
3 2.14 137 97.86 
 
Table 5 - Level of information by community 
 
WERE YOU INFORMED ABOUT 
THE LFTZ PROJECT BEFORE THE 
PROJECT BEGAN? 
WERE YOU INFORMED ABOUT 
THE EXPROPRIATION BEFORE 
THE PROJECT BEGAN? 
COMMUNITY NO YES NO YES 
Idasho 18 2 18 2 
Idotun 22 1 22 1 
Ilege 4 2 5 1 
Imobido 1 5 1 5 
Itoke 19 2 20 1 
Okunraye 13 4 15 2 
Ilekuru 5 6 6 5 
Tiye 15 2 16 1 
Imagbon-Segun 1 8 8 1 
Oke-Segun 8 2 8 2 






Section 3.4: Compensation paid for crops 
 
Between 2010-2013, the LSG paid compensation for crops and buildings but not for empty 
land, even though the MOU entitles affected communities to compensation for land (LSG 
2016, Heinrich Bol Stiftung 2016). Based on the evidence available, it is not clear exactly 
how much total compensation was paid or how the compensation was calculated.  According 
to a Government White Paper, “the scale used by LSG for compensation in 2010-2013 was 
drawn up in 2000, at least a 10 year gap. That scale has by reason of inflation and 
depreciation of the Naira become obsolete and should have been revised upwards” (LSG 
2016). The LFZDC, LWIL, the Lands Bureau, and Ministry of Commerce were unable to 
provide us with records of compensation payments or details on the methods used to calculate 
compensation. 
 
Table 6 shows that 59% of households surveyed were promised compensation, but only 2% 
claimed they were given an opportunity to negotiate compensation. Only 7% were told how 
compensation was calculated only 38 respondents out of 140 (27%) stated that they actually 
received any compensation (Figure 1), and the vast majority of them (97%) felt that this 
compensation did not cover all of their losses (Figure 2).  
 





Table 6 – Promised Compensation 
QUESTION 
YES NO DON’T KNOW 
N % N % N % 
Were you promised any compensation for 
the expropriation? 
83 59.29 56 40.00 1 0.71 
Were you given the opportunity to 
negotiate compensation?  
[Only if answered YES to previous question] 
1 1.79 55 98.21 0 0.0 
Were you told how compensation was 
calculated? 
[Only if answered YES to the first question] 




In a few cases, only a lump sum payment for all crops was granted, but it was unclear to the 
households surveyed how exactly this payment was calculated. Affected communities stated 
that compensation was, in some cases, as low as 10,000 Naira (27 USD) for all crops. Results 
from the survey suggest that the calculation of the amount of compensation to be paid for the 
loss of crops was often discretional. Indeed, respondents frequently reported different levels 
of compensation for the very same crop, even inside the same community. The Government 
White Paper states that “when their people are paid sums of money in the range of N10,000 – 
N300,000 (approximating 27 – 800 USD) they feel short-changed, disgruntled and bitter.” 
 
 Section 3.5: Possible Corruption 
 
The Lands Bureau was unable to provide documentation of how much compensation has been 
paid to communities. However, a local newspaper reported that Lagos State Governor 
Ambode paid an initial 66 Million Naira to affected communities (approximately 183,500 
USD) (The Guardian Nigeria 2016). In 2016, Ambode approved an additional 740 Million 
Naira (approximately 2 million dollars) in compensation for the affected communities (The 
Guardian Nigeria 2016). Presumably all of the compensation was sent to the Resettlement 
Committee, which, under the MOU, is charged with allocating compensation and other 
entitlements among the affected communities. According to the Guardian article,  
 
“Ambode said that an initial N66 million had been paid to owners of Parcel A lands, which houses the 
Dangote Refinery and some other companies while the new compensation approved was for host 
communities of Parcel B, comprising Yegunda and Abomiti zones” (The Guardian Nigeria 2016). 
 
If this is true, there is a noticeable difference between the amount that the LSG reportedly 
paid and the amount that surveyed communities claimed they received. If compensation has 
not trickled down to the household level, then it is possible that intermediaries, including 
those involved in the Resettlement Committee, may have taken significant portions of the 
compensation payments. Intermediaries could have also included chiefs or other community 
“elites” involved in the negotiation around the MOU. The LUA provides that compensation 
may be paid to “the community, the chief, or leader of the community to be disposed of by 
him for the benefit of the community in accordance with…customary law”, or into “some 
fund specified by the Governor” (Section 29(3), GON 1990). The Government White Paper 
does not thoroughly investigate crimes of theft or embezzlement, but states “the revelation at 
the Tribunal was that beneficiaries of compensation were paid in cash and sometimes through 
proxies in circumstances which facilitate diversion of money, theft, embezzlement, 
manipulation, and fraud…it is no wonder that some of the alleged beneficiaries denied 
receiving stated amounts of money shown against their names” (LSG 2016). 
 
Section 3.6: Alternative land 
 
According to our interview with the SERAC representative, a certificate of occupancy for 750 
hectares of resettlement land was provided to the Resettlement Committee in 2009 (Heinrich 
Bol Stiftung 2016). This resettlement land was intended to be shared by all affected 
communities. However, it encroached on land held by three other affected communities, so 
three more affected communities were added to the MOU (Heinrich Bol Stiftung 2016).  
 
In 2014, a certificate of occupancy of 375 hectares was provided to the Lekki Coastal 
Development Association, which is a legal entity managed by the Resettlement Committee 
(LSG 2016). The Government White Paper found that this constituted a breach of the MOU 
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since it is only half of what was promised by the MOU. Moreover, the alternative land was 
not clearly demarcated, making the boundaries unknown. According to our interview with the 
Illekuru community, roughly 96 hectares were sold to a third party, and the remaining portion 
is largely uncultivable swampland. When interviewed, Ilekuru community members claimed 
they were unable to access the resettlement land for farming and other subsistence purposes 
because the land is far away from their homes and widely considered to be uncultivable 
swampland.  
 
Section 3.7: Jobs and Equity Shares 
 
None of the affected households we surveyed were employed by LWIL, even though jobs 
were promised  in the MOU. According the Government White Paper, “LWIL insists that 
members of the communities have been favoured with jobs,” but affected communities 
disagree. Without records showing that jobs were allotted to communities, it is the word of 
one against another (LSG 2016). Additionally, none of the affected households we surveyed 
received equity shares in the LFTZ. Regarding the 2.5% equity share promised by the MOU, 
the Government White Paper found these “entitlements have been and are still being denied to 
the affected communities” (LSG 2016). 
 
 
Section 3.8: Recommendations of the Government White Paper 
 
The Government White Paper recommends that the Ministry of Commerce, Industry and 
Cooperatives, in conjunction with the Lands Bureau and the State Valuation identify the 
communities that have not been resettled and complete the resettlement processes (LSG 
2016). Furthermore, the Government should endeavor to pay compensation before possession 
and the Lands Bureau should give priority of Certificate of Occupancy to excised land (LSG 
2016). The Paper states that those who have not been paid compensation ought to be paid 
promptly using a revised scale for valuing crops (LSG 2016).  It also states that the 
Resettlement Committee should be empowered to vigorously monitor the MOU to ensure 
compliance because the LSG and LWIL have “sidelined” the Resettlement Committee and by 
implication sidelined representatives of the affected communities. Lastly, the Paper 
recommends that the LASG should only acquire land that is reasonably required for 
“overriding public interest” and “not deprive indigenes of the right of possession of land and 




















The evidence provided by this article indicates that the LSG failed to adequately inform, 
consult, compensate, and resettle communities whose tenure rights and livelihoods were 
affected by the development of the LFTZ. Through our interviews and research, we found that 
the government did not follow a transparent and participatory process when acquiring land 
and compensating communities, and overall did not comply with international standards.  
 
Several profound lessons can be drawn from the events that unfolded in Lekki since the early 
2000s. The primary takeaway is that, without a sufficient legal framework and effective 
implementation of the law, there is a risk that land may be acquired without payment of 
compensation sufficient to cover the losses. Moreover, failing to consult and incorporate 
landholders into decision-making processes and excluding them from benefit-sharing 
arrangements can trigger protest and resistance among landholders. In 2015, for example, 
Lekki community members staged a protest and blocked the LFTZ project; a clash ensued 
between communities and police, and this incident resulted in the death of the Managing 
Director of LWIL (LSG 2016). In many other documented land disputes, displacement and 
insufficient compensation trigger conflict which poses significant financial, reputational, and 
security risks for project developers (RRI and TMP Systems 2017). After speaking with 
several affected communities, we found that community tensions appear to be approaching a 
boiling point, and more protests are likely to occur in the future. Perhaps the anger and 
frustration of communities should not come as a surprise. Investments in the LFTZ have 
reportedly surpassed $100 billion (Premium Times 2017), and yet, affected communities 
continue to have barely enough income and food to sustain their livelihoods while they wait 
for the MOU to be fulfilled. As stated by the Government White Paper, “the contribution of 
displacement, impecuniosity, unemployment and youthful exuberance is a predictably 
potentially explosive cocktail capable of causing a serious break down in law and order” 
(LSG 2016). 
 
Honoring the provisions of the MOU should be a top priority for the LSG and LWIL. But 
what can be done to ensure that future expropriations in Nigeria do not leave landholders 
worse off than before their land is acquired? Reforming the LUA would be an essential first 
step. Reforms to the LUA should include provisions that: 
 
1. Provide a clear definition of public purpose to allow for judicial review of State 
Governor’s expropriation decisions. State Governor’s should be obliged to conduct a 
“proportionality test,” which entails examining a proposed expropriation project to 
determine (a) whether the expropriation project is necessary to serve a public purpose 
(there are no less intrusive alternatives), (b) whether the project is suitable (reasonably 
likely to achieve the intended public benefit), and (c) whether the benefits deriving 
from the expropriation are proportionate to costs borne by affected populations and the 
environment (Hoops 2017). The State Governor’s decision on whether a project 
satisfies the proportionality test should be subject to oversight by the courts. 
2. Require assessors to consider both the value of land as well as improvements, crops, 
economic activities on the land when calculating. 
3. Base the calculation of compensation on the “replacement cost” where land is 
expropriated in areas where land markets are weak or non-existent and thus “market 
value” is difficult to ascertain. 
4. Require that compensation must be paid prior to the moment at which the government 
or private companies take possession of the land. In cases where possession is taken 
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before compensation is paid, require the government to pay interest based on the 
delay. 
5. Require the government to provide affected communities with productive alternative 
land where available. 
6. Require investment and benefit-sharing arrangements whereby companies must allow 
affected landholders to own equity in the company and invest in the education, 
healthcare facilities, and other amenities.  
7. Establish an independent valuation board with expert valuers charged with consulting 
and compensating affected landholders. These expert valuers should consider adopting 
the principles established in UN-Habitat’s Guide to Valuation of Unregistered Lands 
(UN Habitat 2017). The process for valuing land and crops should be well-
documented and transparent, and valuers should reflect current market rates for the 
average amounts of crops and livestock found on the land. 
8. Establish a fair consultation and negotiation process whereby affected landholders 
must be surveyed and consulted about their land and loss of livelihoods.  
9. Recognize the indigenous right to Free Prior and Informed Consent and require the 
government to be transparent and ensure meaningful community participation in 
expropriation, compensation, and resettlement decision-making.  
10. Require that compensation must be granted directly to households and establish 
monitoring committees to ensure compliance and prevent elite capture by chiefs and 
other intermediaries. 
 
As a consequence of population growth and resource scarcity, the number of development 
projects in Nigeria and other countries is likely to increase in the future. However, 
development projects initiated without proper consultation, compensation, and resettlement 
will continue to harm the livelihood and wellbeing of affected landholders. Without strong 
legal rights to compensation, resettlement, and participation in project decision-making 
processes, affected landholders in Nigeria will continue to be subjected to severe risks, 
including landlessness, joblessness, and food insecurity (Cernea 2008). Fair and robust 
expropriation and compensation procedures established in the LUA, coupled with effective 
implementation by the Nigerian government, are therefore indispensable to ensuring 
development projects stimulate inclusive growth and development, while not leaving those 
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